The District Court’s decision to dismiss a teacher’s claim for slipping during a fruit break shows that a lack of previous incidents can be decisive on the question of liability.
Debbie Deans was employed by Riverside Christian College in Maryborough when on 4 March 2015 she slipped over a grape during a ‘fruit break’ during the course of her employment, fracturing her left patella.
She sued her employer, claiming that it was negligent for failing to:
(a) take reasonable care for her safety;
(b) establish, maintain and enforce safe methods and systems for her to carry out her employment;
(c) supervise her so as to ensure she carried out her employment safely;
(d) warn her of the possibility of injury to her in carrying out her employment and instruct her in methods of work to avoid the possibility of such injury;
(e) provide a safe work environment within which her was required to perform her duties;
(f) not require her to perform work where the defendant knew, or ought to have known that the carrying out of the work may cause injury to her;
(g) failed to implement a system of inspection and cleaning following “fruit break” when it knew, or ought to have known, that there was a higher probability of slip hazards being created in the area due to the fact that five and six year old children were carrying fruit through the area;
(h) failing to make arrangements for the five and six year old children to store their “fruit break” snacks in an area that was not a high traffic pedestrian area.”
305B General Principles
(1) A person does not breach a duty to take precautions against a risk of injury to a worker unless:
(a) the risk was foreseeable (that is, it is a risk of which the person knew or ought reasonably to have known); and
(b) the risk was not insignificant; and
(c) in the circumstances, a reasonable person in the position of the person would have taken the precautions.
(2) In deciding whether a reasonable person would have taken precautions against a risk of injury, the court is to consider the following (among other relevant things):
(a) the probability that the injury would occur if care were not taken;
(b) the likely seriousness of the injury;
(c) the burden of taking precautions to avoid the risk of injury.
305C Other Principles
In a proceeding relating to liability for a breach of duty—
(a) The burden of taking precautions to avoid a risk of injury includes the burden of taking precautions to avoid similar risks of injury for which the person may be responsible; and
(b) The fact that a risk of injury could have been avoided by doing something in a different way does not of itself give rise to or effect liability for the way in which the thing was done; and
(c) The subsequent taking of action that would (had the action been taken earlier) have avoided a risk of injury does not of itself give rise to or affect liability in relation to the risk and does of itself constitute an admission of liability in connection with the risk.”
Deans’ lawyers argued the general notoriety of young children dropping things and leaving them on the floor meant that this risk was foreseeable as defined in section 305B(1)(a).
Farr SC DCJ rejected this argument, noting there was no evidence of any previous incidents of people slipping on things dropped by children at Riverside Christian College, or at any other school. Nor was there any evidence that Riverside Christian College knew of this particular risk of injury. Therefore, the risk was held not to be foreseeable.
The argument that Riverside Christian College had conceded foreseeability by also pleading a defence of contributory negligence was also rejected because it ignored the statutory definition of “obvious risk” contained in section 305I of the Workers’ Compensation and Rehabilitation Act, and was contrary to the High Court’s decision in Thompson v Woolworths (Queensland) Pty Ltd  HCA 19.
A further issue which Farr SC DCJ considered was whether the risk was not insignificant within the meaning of s305(1)(b) of the Workers’ Compensation and Rehabilitation Act. Farr SC DCJ noted that the fruit break had been taking place for five years without any previous incident, and the relevant area would have been traversed by thousands if not tens of thousands of people at and around the fruit breaks. For these reasons, Farr SC DCJ held that the risk of injury arising from items being dropped on fruit breaks was insignificant.
As a result of these findings, Riverside Christian College had not breached its duty of care, and therefore the claim for negligence had to fail.
This case demonstrates that where a defendant in Queensland has organised for a particular activity without any prior incident for some years, they will have a reasonable chance of defending the claim for personal injury on that basis alone, as the activity in question may not involve risks which are foreseeable or significant within the meaning of the law.
This decision is good news for schools, who can now have some comfort that activities which involve a small degree of risk of personal injury can still take place without the risk of being successfully sued as long as such activities are conducted as safely as practicable.
It is common for workers in the mining industry to work long hours during long shifts, and to perform many such shifts in a short period of time. Exhaustion is therefore a real safety risk.
In this case, the Plaintiff Harold Kerle had been employed as a dump truck operator at the Norwich Park Mine near Dysart in Central Queensland and was severely injured after work in a one vehicle accident on his way home.
This case shows that the duty of care owed by employers and others is not always confined to the work hours or the place of work.
Harold Kerle had completed four consecutive 12 hours shifts at the Norwich Park Mine. He made the fateful decision to commence his journey home at about 6.30am on the morning of 30 October 2008, moments after he had finished his final shift. He lived in Monto, a five hour 430 kilometre drive away.
Shortly before 10am, Kerle crashed his car into a concrete wall after veering onto the right hand side of the road and colliding at high speed on an Armco rail on a bridge crossing at Alma Creek on the Burnett Highway. Kerle sustained significant injuries, including a brain injury and fractures of his ankle, nose and skull. Kerle had no memory of the accident or the events leading up to it.
Alleging the accident was caused by fatigue, Kerle sued his employer Axial HR Pty Ltd (“Axial”), his host employer, HMP Constructions Pty Ltd (“HMP”) and the operator of the Norwich Park Mine, BM Alliance Coal Operations Pty Ltd (“BMA”). Continue reading “Employers & Mine Operator liable for worker’s injuries after work”
Amy Louise Robinson was employed by activewear company Lorna Jane Pty Ltd between July and December 2012 as manager of Lorna Jane’s DFO store at Skygate near Brisbane Airport.
Ms Robinson claimed to have suffered a psychiatric injury from workplace bullying by Megan McCarthy (Lorna Jane’s learning and development manager) and haemorrhoids when lifting and moving heavy boxes of stock during the course of her employment.
Vicarious liability is a common law principle which imposes liability despite the employer’s not itself being at fault. The claim for psychiatric injury alleged that Lorna Jane was vicariously liable for the actions of McCarthy and also that an email from a former DFO store employee named Ms Maninnen which alleged ill-treatment of Robinson by McCarthy had put the company ‘on notice’ and that it had subsequently failed to investigate.
Continue reading “Lorna Jane’s comprehensive court win”
It is a well established principle in the law of negligence that a defendant should only have to take precautions against reasonably forseeable risks to others. Reasonable forseeability can be contrasted with risks that are “far fetched or fanciful”.
The 2013 Queensland Court of Appeal cases of Heywood v Commercial Electrical Pty Ltd  QCA 270 and Suncorp Staff Pty Ltd v Larkin  QCA 281 are useful reminders of the centrality of the concept of reasonable forseeability of risk in negligence cases against employers.
Continue reading “The question of reasonable forseeability of injury”