Mason C.J., Brennan, Deane, Dawson, Toohey Gaudron and McHugh JJ.
GEORGE v. ROCKETT
(1990) 170 CLR 104
20 June 1990
Justices (Q.)—Search warrant—Issue—Requirements—Reasonable grounds for suspicion or belief—Whether justice must entertain suspicion or belief—Facts to found reasonable suspicion or belief—Sworn complaint—Relevance of statements otherwise than on oath—The Criminal Code (Q.), s. 679.
MASON C.J., BRENNAN, DEANE, DAWSON, TOOHEY, GAUDRON AND McHUGH JJ.
On 22 August 1989 the first respondent, Detective Sergeant Rockett, attended at the office of the second respondent, a stipendiary magistrate, and applied for the issue of a search warrant under the provisions of s.679(b) of The Criminal Code (Q.). Section 679 reads as follows:
” If it appears to a justice, on complaint made on oath,
that there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that there
is in any house, vessel, vehicle, aircraft, or place –
(a) Anything with respect to which any offence which
is such that the offender may be arrested with
or without warrant has been, or is suspected, on
reasonable grounds, to have been, committed; or
(b) Anything whether animate or inanimate and whether
living or dead as to which there are reasonable
grounds for believing that it will of itself or by
or on scientific examination, afford evidence as
to the commission of any offence; or
(c) Anything as to which there are reasonable grounds
for believing that it is intended to be used for
the purpose of committing any such offence;
he may issue his warrant directing a police officer or
police officers named therein or all police officers to
enter, by force if necessary, and to search such house,
vessel, vehicle, aircraft, or place, and to seize any such
thing if found, and to take it before a justice to be dealt
with according to law.
Any such warrant is to be executed by day unless the
justice, by the warrant, specially authorises it to be
executed by night, in which case it may be so executed.
Where it appears on the complaint that an offence
involving the safety of an aircraft has been is being or
may be committed on board or in relation to the aircraft
the justice may direct in his warrant that any person on
board the aircraft or any person who is about to board the
aircraft may be searched.”
“COMPLAINT TO GROUND SEARCH WARRANT
The Complaint of Michael Daniel ROCKETT of The Office of the
Special Prosecutor, 15-23 Adelaide Street, Brisbane in the
State of Queensland made this 17th day of August, 1989
before the undersigned, a Justice of the Peace for the said
State, who says:
(1) that there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that
there is in the rooms of Q.D. George, Hillhouse and
Company, Solicitors, situated at 9th floor, Bank of New
Zealand building, 410 Queen Street, Brisbane in the said
State certain property, to wit a bundle of A4 pages in
the handwriting of Sir Terence LEWIS containing his
comments on the evidence taken before the Commission of
Inquiry conducted by Mr. G.E. Fitzgerald, Q.C. and part
of the transcript of the evidence taken before the
aforesaid Commission of Inquiry and annotated in the
handwriting of the said Sir Terence LEWIS all of which
were in the possession of one Dr. Joseph M. SIRACUSA
until the 11th day of August, 1989 when they were
forwarded by the said Dr. Joseph M. SIRACUSA to Messrs.
Q.D. George, Hillhouse and Company, Solicitors.
(b) as to which there are reasonable grounds for
believing that it will of itself or by or on
scientific examination, afford evidence as to the
commission of offences, namely
1. that on the 17th day of October, 1988 at Brisbane
in the State of Queensland, the said Terence
Murray LEWIS in a judicial proceeding, namely an
inquiry by a Commission within the meaning of the
Commissions of Inquiry Act 1950-1988, whilst
giving evidence before the said Commission,
knowingly falsely swore to the effect that he
then had no idea what certain notations in his
own handwriting in his 1980 and 1981 notebooks
referred to, and that the said false evidence was
material to a question then depending in the said
2. that on the 11th day of October, 1988 at Brisbane
in the State of Queensland, the said Terence
Murray LEWIS, in a judicial proceeding, namely an
inquiry by a Commission within the meaning of the
Commissions of Inquiry Act 1950-1988, whilst
giving evidence before the said Commission,
knowingly falsely swore to the effect that he
had never met in a private room at the Crest
Hotel with Jack ROOKLYN, and that the said
false evidence was material to a question then
depending in the said proceedings.
(2) and that the grounds of his suspicion and belief are as
There is evidence that the bundle of A4 pages was in the
handwriting of the said Sir Terence LEWIS and consisted
of approximately thirty to forty pages of comments
on the evidence by the said Sir Terence LEWIS under
specific headings and was in the possession of the
said Dr. Joseph M. SIRACUSA on Friday, the 11th day of
August, 1989 and was forwarded by the said Dr. Joseph M.
SIRACUSA to the said Q.D. George, Hillhouse and Company,
Solicitors, on that day. There is further evidence that
the annotated transcript also consisted of approximately
thirty to forty pages and was also in the possession of
the said Dr. Joseph M. SIRACUSA on the 11th August, 1989
and that this was also forwarded by the said Dr. Joseph
M. SIRACUSA on that same day to the said Q.D. George,
Hillhouse and Company, Solicitors.
THEREUPON the said Michael Daniel ROCKETT prays that I, the
said Justice, will proceed in the premises according to law.
Signature of Complainant
Sworn before me this 21st day of August, 1989 at Brisbane in
the said State.
Signature of Stipendiary Magistrate”
The magistrate issued a search warrant which, having recited substantially the whole of the complaint except for par.(2), stated that it appeared to the magistrate that there were “reasonable grounds for so suspecting and so believing”.
This appeal from the order of the Full Court turns on the construction of s.679 of the Code. Section 10 of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) and s.711 of The Criminal Code of Western Australia are in substantially the same terms. In reference to the procedure for issuing a search warrant under s.10 of the Crimes Act, Mason J. said in Baker v. Campbell (1983) 153 CLR 52, at p 82:
” For present purposes the important characteristics of
the search warrant procedure are that its foundation is the
making of an order by a judicial officer and that the
warrant which issues by virtue of the order authorizes the
search and seizure of documents in the possession of
another for use in the investigation and in any subsequent
trial arising out of the investigation.”
A search warrant thus authorizes an invasion of premises without the consent of persons in lawful possession or occupation thereof. The validity of such a warrant is necessarily dependent upon the fulfilment of the conditions governing its issue. In prescribing conditions governing the issue of search warrants, the legislature has sought to balance the need for an effective criminal justice system against the need to protect the individual from arbitrary invasions of his privacy and property. Search warrants facilitate the gathering of evidence against, and the apprehension and conviction of, those who have broken the criminal law. In enacting s.679, the legislature has given primacy to the public interest in the effective administration of criminal justice over the private right of the individual to enjoy his privacy and property. The common law has long been jealous of the prima facie immunity from seizure of papers and possessions: see Holdsworth, A History of English Law, vol.10, (1938), pp 668-672. Except in the case of a warrant issued for the purpose of searching a place for stolen goods, the common law refused to countenance the issue of search warrants at all and refused to permit a constable or government official to enter private property without the permission of the occupier: Leach v. Money (1765) 19 State Tr.1001; Entick v. Carrington (1765) 19 State Tr.1029. Historically, the justification for these limitations on the power of entry and search was based on the rights of private property: Entick, at p 1066. In modern times, the justification has shifted increasingly to the protection of privacy: see Feldman, The Law Relating to Entry, Search and Seizure, (1986), pp 1-2.
” It is the duty of a justice before issuing … a
warrant, to satisfy himself that there are grounds for
suspecting and grounds for believing the respective matters
mentioned in s. 711 of the Criminal Code and that those
grounds are reasonable.”
When the justice is so satisfied and a warrant is issued, the warrant should express the justice’s satisfaction that there are reasonable grounds for the suspicion and belief: Morse v. Harlock (1977) WAR 65, at pp 76-77. In Parker v. Churchill (1985) 9 FCR 316; 63 ALR 326, Burchett J. said (at p 322; p 333):
” The duty, which the justice of the peace must perform in
respect of an information, is not some quaint ritual of the
law, requiring a perfunctory scanning of the right formal
phrases, perceived but not considered, and followed by
simply an inevitable signature. What is required by the
law is that the justice of the peace should stand between
the police and the citizen, to give real attention to the
question whether the information proffered by the police
does justify the intrusion they desire to make into the
privacy of the citizen and the inviolate security of his
personal and business affairs.”
When a statute prescribes that there must be “reasonable grounds” for a state of mind – including suspicion and belief – it requires the existence of facts which are sufficient to induce that state of mind in a reasonable person. That was the point of Lord Atkin’s famous, and now orthodox, dissent in Liversidge v. Anderson (1942) AC 206: see Nakkuda Ali v. M.F. De S. Jayaratne (1951) AC 66, at pp 76-77; Reg. v. I.R.C.; Ex parte Rossminster (1980) AC 952, at pp 1000,1011,1017-1018; Bradley v. The Commonwealth (1973) 128 CLR 557, at pp 574-575; W.A. Pines Pty. Ltd. v. Bannerman (1980) 41 FLR 169, at pp 180-181; 30 ALR 559, at pp 566-567. That requirement opens many administrative decisions to judicial review and precludes the arbitrary exercise of many statutory powers: see, for example, Attorney-General v. Reynolds (1980) AC 637. Therefore it must appear to the issuing justice, not merely to the person seeking the search warrant, that reasonable grounds for the relevant suspicion and belief exist. The principle was stated by Fox J. in Reg. v. Tillett; Ex parte Newton (1969) 14 FLR 101, at p 106:
” Section 10 requires that the justice himself be
satisfied ‘that there is reasonable ground for suspecting
…’. It is well established that on language such as this
it is for the justice to come to his own conclusion on
materials presented to him (Hope v. Evered ((1886) 17
QBD 338); Bridgeman v. Macalister ((1898) 8 QLJ 151);
Feather v. Rogers ((1909) 9 SR(NSW) 192; 26 WN 27);
Bowden v. Box ((1916) GLR(N.Z.)443); Mitchell v. New
Plymouth Club (Incorporated) ((1958) NZLR 1070); T.V.W.
Ltd. v. Robinson ((1964) WAR 33); Seven Seas Publishing
Pty. Ltd. v. Sullivan ((1968) NZLR 663). In Bowden v.
Box the statute provided that a justice, if satisfied by
information on oath that there was reasonable ground for
belief as to certain matters, could grant a warrant. At
p 444 Edwards J. said: ‘It is impossible to construe this
enactment as an authority to a justice to issue a search
warrant upon the oath alone of a constable or of any other
person that “there is reasonable ground to believe that
liquor is sold”, etc. So to hold would be to hold that the
justice may discharge the judicial duty cast upon him
by acting, parrot-like, upon the bald assertion of the
informant.’ This expression of view was adopted by T.A.
Gresson J. in Mitchell v New Plymouth Club (Incorporated).”
It follows that the issuing justice needs to be satisfied that there are sufficient grounds reasonably to induce that state of mind.
9. The matters which must be made to appear to a justice must appear, as s.679 prescribes, “on complaint made on oath”. This requirement reflects the ancient view of the common law that a magistrate who issues a warrant otherwise than on an information on oath is liable to an action for false imprisonment or trespass: see, for example, Caudle v. Seymour (1841) 1 QB 889, at pp 893,894 (113 ER 1372, at pp 1373,1374). See Feldman, op cit, p 74. In T.V.W. Ltd. v. Robinson Negus J., in the paragraph following that earlier cited, said (at p 37):
” (The justice) cannot satisfy himself about those matters
in accordance with the requirements of the Criminal Code
unless the grounds are stated on oath preferably in the
A more stringent requirement was stated in Bridgeman v. Macalister (1898) 8 QLJ 151, where a search warrant was issued in purported pursuance of the Towns Police Act (19 Vict. No.24), which contained provisions similar in relevant respects to those in s.679(1). Griffith C.J., speaking for the Full Court of the Supreme Court, held that “the information must state the ground, the reasonable ground, for suspicion” and, finding that the information “merely contains a statement that the deponent suspects they are concealed, for which suspicion he gives no relevant foundation”, he declared that there was no ground for the exercise of the magistrate’s power to issue the warrant. This view has been followed in other jurisdictions (see Feather v. Rogers (1909) 9 SR(NSW) 192 and Mitchell v. New Plymouth Club (Inc.) (1958) NZLR 1070) and should now be accepted as correct.
“The statements made before the information was sworn
were apparently not made on oath. They were therefore
That is not to say that a justice before whom a complaint is sworn should abstain from questioning the complainant if the justice wishes to obtain some confirmation of what appears in the complaint. The requirement is that the sworn complaint should contain sufficient facts to found the reasonable suspicion and the reasonable belief respectively mentioned in s.679. If that requirement is not satisfied, the information otherwise conveyed to the issuing justice is immaterial but, if that requirement is satisfied, the justice may seek confirmation by inquiry of the complainant.
The sufficiency of the sworn complaint by itself to satisfy the magistrate that there were reasonable grounds for suspicion and belief was not challenged in the Full Court. However, the question was raised in this Court in the course of argument. In the Full Court, the case proceeded on the footing that the magistrate was entitled to have regard to all the material that was put before him or, at all events, to the complaint and to the statutory declaration. But, if the warrant is invalid by reason of the insufficiency of the sworn complaint, no evidence or argument which might have been proffered to the Full Court can save it. It will therefore be necessary to consider whether, on the material contained in the sworn complaint, the magistrate could have been satisfied that there were reasonable grounds for Rockett’s suspicion and belief. If, on the material contained in the sworn complaint, the magistrate could not have been so satisfied, it is immaterial that he might have been satisfied on the material contained in the statutory declaration or in the answers which Rockett gave to his questioning.
14. Suspicion, as Lord Devlin said in Hussien v. Chong Fook Kam (1970) AC 942, at p 948, “in its ordinary meaning is a state of conjecture or surmise where proof is lacking: ‘I suspect but I cannot prove.'” The facts which can reasonably ground a suspicion may be quite insufficient reasonably to ground a belief, yet some factual basis for the suspicion must be shown. In Queensland Bacon Pty. Ltd. v. Rees (1966) 115 CLR 266, a question was raised as to whether a payee had reason to suspect that the payer, a debtor, “was unable to pay (its) debts as they became due” as that phrase was used in s.95(4) of the Bankruptcy Act 1924 (Cth). Kitto J. said (at p 303):
“A suspicion that something exists is more than a mere idle
wondering whether it exists or not; it is a positive
feeling of actual apprehension or mistrust, amounting to ‘a
slight opinion, but without sufficient evidence’, as
Chambers’s Dictionary expresses it. Consequently, a reason
to suspect that a fact exists is more than a reason to
consider or look into the possibility of its existence.
The notion which ‘reason to suspect’ expresses in sub-s.(4)
is, I think, of something which in all the circumstances
would create in the mind of a reasonable person in the
position of the payee an actual apprehension or fear that
the situation of the payer is in actual fact that which the
sub-section describes – a mistrust of the payer’s ability
to pay his debts as they become due and of the effect which
acceptance of the payment would have as between the payee
and the other creditors.”
The objective circumstances sufficient to show a reason to believe something need to point more clearly to the subject matter of the belief, but that is not to say that the objective circumstances must establish on the balance of probabilities that the subject matter in fact occurred or exists: the assent of belief is given on more slender evidence than proof. Belief is an inclination of the mind towards assenting to, rather than rejecting, a proposition and the grounds which can reasonably induce that inclination of the mind may, depending on the circumstances, leave something to surmise or conjecture.
So to hold does not deprive the requirement of “reasonable grounds for believing” in par.(b) of significance. That significance depends on the manner in which a complaint which grounds a search warrant and the warrant itself identify the object of the search. A thing must be identified either as a specific object or as an object which answers a particular description. It is by reference to the means of identification of the object of the search that the sufficiency of both reasonable grounds for suspecting and reasonable grounds for believing must be judged. Where a specific object is identified, the question whether there are reasonable grounds for believing that, if it exists and is found, it will afford evidence as to the commission of an offence is a discrete question to be answered according to the facts set out in the complaint. Where the object is identified by description, the broader and less specific the description, the more difficult it is likely to be to satisfy the requirement of reasonable grounds for believing that a thing answering the description will afford evidence of the commission of an offence. Conversely, the narrower and more specific the description, the more difficult it may be to satisfy the requirement of reasonable grounds for suspecting that the designated object is in the particular location. The point is probably best made by illustration.
Suppose that a person has been killed by a revolver bullet and that A, who is believed on reasonable grounds to be the killer, was seen burying an object wrapped in cloth in the backyard of his house. If application were made to a justice for a warrant to search for “an object wrapped in cloth” in A’s backyard, the fact that A had been seen burying something wrapped in cloth would obviously provide compelling grounds for suspecting that an object of that description was in that place. On the other hand, there may, depending on the circumstances, be difficulty in sustaining a conclusion that there were reasonable grounds for believing that any object which answered that general description (i.e. “an object wrapped in cloth”) “will”, if found, afford evidence as to the commission of an offence. Conversely, if the object of the proposed search was described as a revolver, the grounds for suspecting that it was hidden in A’s backyard would be much less compelling. There would, however, be little difficulty in satisfying the requirement of reasonable grounds for believing that the object so described would, if it was found in that place, afford evidence as to the commission of the particular offence.
It may be suggested that this emphasis upon description of the object of the search proposed to be conducted pursuant to a search warrant constitutes little more than a play on words. But that is not the case. The warrant, if issued, authorizes entry to search for the described object and authorizes the seizure of any object which comes within the particular description. In other words, the description of the object of the search is a reference point for delimiting the scope of the warrant. The wider and less specific the description of the object, the wider will be the powers of seizure which the warrant confers. On the other hand, as has been seen, the wider and less specific the description of the designated object, the more difficult will be the task of persuading the justice that there are reasonable grounds for belief that the object so described will, if found, afford evidence of the commission of the particular offence. Thus, the requirement of “reasonable grounds for believing” in par.(b) performs the important function of preventing the authority to search and seize which a warrant confers from being worded in unjustifiably wide terms. Again, the point is best made by illustration.
Suppose the sworn complaint placed before a justice establishes reasonable grounds for suspecting that the books and records of a listed public company in respect of a particular financial year contain an entry which will afford evidence that an executive of the company has appropriated a sum of money to the credit of his personal account with a particular bank and the complaint shows that there is evidence that the executive had no authority so to apply the money. In such a case, the complaint would establish reasonable grounds for suspecting that the particular entry existed and reasonable grounds for believing that, if it did exist, it would (i.e. “will”) afford evidence of the commission of an offence. The complaint before the justice would, in those circumstances, be adequate to justify the issue of a warrant to search for and seize any written entry to the designated effect in the company’s books and records for the relevant year. It would, of course, be necessary that the suspected entry be identified with sufficient precision. On the other hand, the material before the justice could not justify the issue of a warrant authorizing search for or seizure of all the books and records of the company for the particular year. First, if the object of the authorized search and seizure were described in terms of “all those books and records”, the material before the justice would not establish that the object so described would afford evidence of the commission of an offence. That material would only have established reasonable grounds for suspecting that the object (i.e. the books and records for the relevant year) contained an entry that would afford such evidence. Secondly, even if the material before the magistrate had gone so far as to establish reasonable grounds for believing that such an entry existed somewhere in those books and records, the description of the object of the authorized search and seizure would be unjustifiably wide. It would extend to authorizing search for, and seizure of, records which were unrelated to the particular entry and which were not suggested to afford evidence of the relevant kind.
In the present case, Rockett identified the things for which he was seeking a search warrant as a bundle of A4 pages in Lewis’s writing and part of the transcript of the Commission hearings bearing Lewis’s handwritten annotations. It was not disputed that the sworn complaint contained sufficient material to satisfy the magistrate that there were reasonable grounds for suspecting that such documents were in the solicitor’s office. The critical question is whether there was sufficient material in the sworn complaint to satisfy the magistrate that there were reasonable grounds for believing that those documents “will … afford evidence as to the commission of” the two offences set out in the sworn complaint with which Lewis had been charged.
The phrase “will afford evidence as to the commission of (an) offence” appearing in s.10 of the Crimes Act was considered in Baker v. Campbell. In that case, the plaintiff sought an order directed to a member of the Australian Federal Police, to whom a search warrant had been issued pursuant to s.10 of the Crimes Act, to restrain him from seizing documents which were the subject of legal professional privilege. The question in that case was not the general scope of the power to search and seize but whether there was a category of exemption of documents for which privilege might be claimed and maintained. Although the Court divided on the availability of the privilege where there were no judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings in or by reference to which the admissibility of privileged documents might be tested, the case does not suggest that the only things for which a search warrant might be issued are things which are or will become admissible in evidence. The power to issue a search warrant is in aid of criminal investigation as well as in aid of proof at the trial, though it is necessary that the investigation should have reached the stage where reasonable grounds for the statutory suspicion and belief can be sworn to. An object will answer the description in par.(b) if there are reasonable grounds for believing that it will assist directly or indirectly in disclosing that an offence has been committed or in establishing or revealing the details of the offence, the circumstances in which it was committed, the identity of the person or persons who committed it or any other information material to the investigation of those matters.
If, in the present case, the first of the two objects of the search warrant had been identified in the complaint as a bundle of A4 pages in the handwriting of Sir Terence Lewis containing either a statement or statements about the meaning of the notations in Sir Terence Lewis’s 1980-1981 notebooks or a statement or statements to the effect that Sir Terence Lewis had met the person called Jack Rooklyn at the Crest Hotel, a question would have arisen as to whether a warrant to search for the whole bundle of A4 pages, as distinct from a page or pages containing the relevant statement or statements, was wider than could be justified. The answer to that question would, no doubt, depend upon whether the complaint justified a conclusion that the bundle of pages should, in the circumstances, be seen as a single thing or upon whether pages in the bundle other than those containing relevant statements should be seen as part of the evidentiary context within which the relevant statements should be read.
In fact, neither of the objects of search (that is, the bundle of A4 pages and the part of the transcript of evidence) was identified in the complaint or the purported search warrant by a description which required that it contain some statement or statements relevant to the commission of one or other of the alleged offences. The sworn complaint was inadequate to found a conclusion that the identified bundle of documents would, if found, actually contain such a statement or statements. Consequently, the complaint was inadequate to found the magistrate’s conclusion that there were reasonable grounds for “believing” that the designated objects of the search would, if found, afford evidence as to the commission of an offence. It follows that the terms of the search warrant were not supported by the sworn material placed before the magistrate.
In this Court, counsel for the appellant attacked the reasoning of the Full Court on the footing that the Court held that it would be sufficient if there were reasonable grounds for believing that the documents in question contained only exculpatory observations. The point would be well taken if the Full Court had held that the magistrate could not have been satisfied that there were reasonable grounds for believing that the documents mentioned in the complaint and search warrant contained anything more than exculpatory observations. Things which tend to show merely that no offence was committed are not things which will afford evidence as to the commission of an offence. But things may have a dual character, tending at once to establish an element of an offence and tending to exculpate one or more persons from criminal liability. Things which afford evidence of an element of an offence and which also tend to exculpate a person from criminal liability may nonetheless be things which “will … afford evidence as to the commission of any offence”. Connolly J. (with whom Ambrose J. agreed) appears to have approached the matter on the footing that the documents covered by the search warrant might ultimately prove to be capable of affording both inculpatory and exculpatory evidence:
“If, on examination, they contained any observations,
whether inculpatory or exculpatory, touching (Lewis’s)
notations in his own handwriting in his 1980 and 1981
pocket notebooks or touching a meeting at the Crest Hotel
with a person who might, possibly by other evidence, be
demonstrated to be the same person as the man named in the
second charge, such notations were capable of affording
evidence ‘as to the commission of the offences’ in the
sense of being relevant to the proofs to be adduced by the
prosecution as well the proofs which might be adduced by
His Honour did not analyse the material placed before the magistrate, but stated the opinion that “the material before him amply warranted the conclusion to which he came”, that is, “the requisite conclusion” under s.679. The material to which his Honour was referring was either all the material laid before the magistrate or at least the statutory declaration as well as the sworn complaint. Had it been open to the Full Court to look at all the material, it would be necessary now for this Court to consider whether it revealed reasonable grounds for believing that the documents in respect of which the warrant was sought, or such of them as contained statements relevant to the two offences mentioned in the complaint, would afford evidence of the commission by Lewis of either of those offences. It would have been necessary to consider the nature of the evidence given before the Commission of Inquiry to which the charges of perjury related, the passages in the transcript of evidence on which Lewis’s handwritten notes had been made and the possibility that inculpatory inferences could be drawn from notes relating to events which had been said by Lewis to be unremembered. Had it appeared that there were no reasonable grounds for believing that those documents or any of them would afford anything more than exculpatory evidence, the warrant would have had to be set aside; but, had that material revealed reasonable grounds for believing that the documents would afford evidence of the commission by Lewis of either of the offences with which he had been charged, the order to review would have had to be discharged. However, the sworn complaint itself must be sufficient to satisfy the court on the return of an order to review that the warrant was properly issued. The sworn complaint in this case contains no facts which might have satisfied the magistrate that there were reasonable grounds for believing that the documents for which the search warrant was sought would afford evidence as to the commission of the offences set out in the complaint. It contains nothing save the assertion by Rockett that there are reasonable grounds for his own belief.
We were invited to adjourn the formal pronouncing of this order if we were of the view that the warrant was invalid. That course would allow the swearing of a fresh complaint which might ground the issue of a valid warrant and thereby preclude the possibility of the return of the documents to the appellant and their loss to the prosecution. But this is not a sufficient reason for withholding the relief to which the appellant is otherwise entitled.
Appeal allowed with costs.
Set aside the order of the Full Court of the Supreme Court and in lieu thereof order that the order to review be made absolute.
The appellant be at liberty to apply for an order for costs of the order to review and of the hearing in the Full Court within fourteen days. Unless otherwise ordered, no order as to the costs of those proceedings.